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BEYOND AUTOMATION SURPRISES: A SIMULATOR STUDY OF
DISTURBANCE MANAGEMENT ON HIGHLY AUTOMATED FLIGHT DECKS
Mark I. Nikolic
The Ohio State University
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Columbus, OH
Nadine B. Sarter
The University of Michigan
Center for Ergonomics
Ann Arbor, MI
Error prevention alone will never be sufficient for improving safety in complex high-risk systems, such as aviation.
This approach needs to be combined with better support for error and disturbance management which, in turn,
requires an improved understanding of current strategies for coping with errors and the resulting disturbances to the
flight. The present research has sought systematic empirical evidence to expand our understanding of the
disturbance management process on modern flight decks. A simulator study was conducted with twelve B747-400
airline pilots in order to examine (the effectiveness of) their strategies for diagnosing and recovering from
disturbances, and the impact of current automation design on these processes. Pilots flew a one-hour scenario (with a
confederate copilot) which contained challenging events that probed pilots’ knowledge of, and proficiency in, using
the autoflight system. A process tracing methodology was used to analyze and identify patterns in strategies across
pilots. Overall, pilots completed the scenario successfully but varied considerably in how they coped with
disturbances to their flight path. Our results show that aspects of feedback design delayed the detection, and thus
escalated the severity, of a disturbance. Diagnostic episodes were rare due to pilots’ knowledge gaps as well as timecriticality. Our findings can inform the development of design and training solutions to observed difficulties with
error and disturbance management in a variety of domains.
Introduction
Human error is cited as the cause, or a contributing
factor, in the majority of aviation incidents and
accidents (e.g., Boeing, 1994). Yet the very low
accident rate in this domain illustrates that aviation
exhibits a strong degree of error resilience thanks to
pilots’ successful management of their errors and
associated disturbances to the flight. In highly
complex, dynamic, and event-driven domains, such
as aviation, operators often need to manage
consequences of breakdowns in human-machine
performance that interact, cascade and escalate over
time while continuing to maintain the ongoing
process (such as flying the airplane). This activity can
be characterized as disturbance management, since,
from a practitioner’s perspective, the potentially
negative system effects of an error are more relevant
than the error per se.
Disturbance management refers to the activity of
diagnosing the underlying source(s) of a disturbance
(i.e., a deviation from a desired state) in parallel with
coping with the disturbance itself by maintaining the
integrity and goals (i.e., efficiency, safety) of an
underlying dynamic process (Woods, 1988). In the
aviation domain, for example, a pilot needs to
diagnose the source (for example, an erroneous input

to the FMS) of an observed disturbance (such as a
deviation from the flight path) and cope with the
disturbance (by bringing the airplane back on course)
while maintaining the integrity of the underlying
process (i.e., while continuing to fly the airplane).
While disturbance management is usually discussed
in the context of system faults, the same activities
tend to be involved in handling the consequences of
breakdowns in the interaction between humans,
machines, and the complex dynamic environment in
which they collaborate. We will therefore use the
term “disturbance management” to refer to pilots’
efforts to cope with the effects of automation-related
erroneous actions and assessments.
Despite the importance of disturbance management for
system safety, few studies have examined its
components in real-world dynamic environments (for
some examples, see Klinect et al., 1999; Woods, 1984).
The majority of work in this area has focused on error
detection, leaving unanswered questions about the other
stages of disturbance management (i.e., diagnosis and
recovery). Earlier studies suggest that diagnosis does not
necessarily occur or precede recovery during dynamic
disturbance management (Kanse and Schaaf, 2001).
Furthermore, an examination of how technological tools
shape disturbance management seems to be missing
from most earlier efforts.
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.In the context of pilot-automation interaction and
performance breakdowns on modern flight decks, our
goal was to determine whether, and under what
circumstances, pilots attempt to diagnose before they
respond, and to what extent diagnosis is required for
successful disturbance handling. Another objective
was to examine the range of recovery strategies used,
especially when they are influenced by the design of
flight deck automation.
Methods
As the final step in a research program that included
jump-seat observations, a flight instructor survey, and
an incident database analysis, a high-fidelity
simulator study was conducted with type-rated airline
pilots in order to examine error and disturbance
management in a semi-controlled full-mission flight
simulation context.
Participants
Pilot volunteers were recruited from two major U.S.
carriers and one airplane manufacturer. Twelve typerated Boeing 747-400 pilots (11 current, 1 recently
retired; mean hours on type = 3837.75, SD = 2478)
participated in the study and were paid $100 for their
involvement.
Simulator
The simulation was conducted on a fixed-base 747400 flight simulator. The 747-400 is a highly
automated four-engine long-haul passenger aircraft.
The simulator was equipped with fully functional
displays and control interfaces. An Evans &
Sutherland ESIG 3350 image generation system
rendered a panoramic out-of-window visual scene
which covered 45° horizontally and 34° vertically for
each pilot.
Procedure
After briefing the flight with the experimenter and
reviewing all flight-related paperwork, the
participating pilot joined the confederate pilot in the
simulator. The confederate knew the purpose of the
study, occupied the right (co-pilot) seat, and helped
ensure that scenario events occurred as designed. The
confederate pilot was instructed not to be overly
proactive in helping participating pilots detect their
errors. However, he was instructed to intervene (by
directing the participant’s attention) if the detection
delay jeopardized the experimenter’s likelihood to
observe a recovery. The confederate was also asked
to elicit pilots’ reasoning about problems by asking

relevant questions to expose the pilot’s intentions and
reasoning. Interactive air traffic control was provided
by the experimenter/observer to help ensure the
proper evolution of the scenario by issuing planned
and improvised clearances. After reviewing the
planned route and the current state of the aircraft, the
scenario began in-flight with the aircraft level at 9000
feet, during the initial climb-out phase. The scenario
ended once the aircraft landed at Los Angeles and
came to a complete stop on the runway. The pilot
then remained in the simulator cab and was debriefed
by the experimenter for another 30-60 minutes.
Scenario
All participants flew the same one-hour daytime
scenario from San Francisco to Los Angeles in the
role of pilot-in-command. Weather throughout the
scenario was clear with minimal winds. Based on
data gathered from our earlier survey, observations,
and consultations with domain experts, several
scenario events were designed that created a high
probability
of
observing
automation-related
disturbances by placing heavy knowledge and
attentional demands on pilots resulting in the
potential for breakdowns in human-machine
communication and coordination. Since errors and
disturbances were not introduced through
experimenter-induced system failures or unrealistic
clearances, they were not necessarily observed for
each pilot on each event.
Selected Scenario Events
Because of space limitations, this paper will present
results from two of the events that were used in the
scenario.
LNAV Capture. After crossing PESCA, ATC
instructed the aircraft to continue on a 140 degree
heading instead of turning left to continue on the
flight plan. As a result, the aircraft will not physically
cross the next two waypoints that are programmed
into the Flight Management Computer (FMC) and are
kept in the route. Thus, if the route is not
reprogrammed by the pilot, the autopilot will attempt
to return to these waypoints and result in unwanted
aircraft behavior when the pilot attempts to rejoin the
course by activating the LNAV mode.
VNAV ALT Mode. In order to begin an automated
descent, the autoflight system must be in the ‘VNAV
PTH’ mode. However, in our scenario, the
automation was likely to enter the ‘VNAV ALT’
mode due to cruise altitude changes given by air
traffic control. If the pilot does not actively change
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the mode back to ‘VNAV PTH’ (typically, by
changing the cruise altitude in the CDU interface of
the Flight Management System and then pushing the
altitude knob), the aircraft will not descend as
expected at the top-of-descent (TOD) point, and may
potentially miss an altitude target. This event could
elicit a mode error due to either incomplete system
knowledge or a monitoring breakdown, and could
have resulted in an altitude violation if it was not
detected and corrected in a timely manner.
Data Collection and Analysis
Multi-angle video and audio recordings were made to
assist in recreating verbal and behavioral protocols.
This information was supplemented by an observer,
who sat directly behind the pilots in the simulator cab
and noted pilot responses to events. Upon completion
of the scenario, the participating pilot was debriefed
by the experimenter in order to review and clarify
any ambiguities about his scenario performance and
to probe participants’ knowledge of the automated
flight system. These sources of data were combined
to form a coherent process trace (Woods, 1993) of
participant behavior which can be compared across
participants as well as to canonical or “standard”
recovery paths for each event.

instead of the 070 heading as instructed by ATC.
All pilots eventually managed to recover their course,
although minor deviations occurred for two pilots
(see Figure 1). After receiving the ATC clearance to
intercept their normal course via a 070 heading, all
pilots made the initial turn using the HDG SEL mode
(a lateral mode at a low level of automation). The
recovery processes from that point on fall into two
categories. One group of five pilots reprogrammed
the route prior to engaging the LNAV mode
(represented on the lower half of Figure 1). A second
group of seven pilots activated the LNAV mode
without updating the original route in the FMS. In
general, the group that reprogrammed the route first
was more aware of the current state and logic of the
automation. These pilots recognized that the FMS
route contained “stale” information that was no
longer applicable to the new context.
composite

LNAV CAPTURE
dials hdg
to course

pushes LNAV

dials 070 hdg

pushes
HDG SEL

pushes LNAV

programs new
intercept course

pushes LNAV

programs new
intercept course

minor deviation

on course

Canonical path

dials hdg
to course

Results
All twelve pilots completed the scenario for this
study “successfully” in the sense that they all made a
safe landing. However, every pilot struggled at some
point with handling events during the simulated
flight, and every scenario unfolded in a unique way
because pilots used a variety of strategies for
managing events and recovering from disturbances.
When possible, a canonical solution path was defined
by a subject matter expert for the event. This path
represented the most efficient but not necessarily the
only correct or successful sequence of pilot actions
for the event. It provides a single frame of reference
from which to compare performance across pilots.
LNAV Capture
This event examined how pilots recovered their
original course after an air traffic control clearance
caused them to bypass two of the waypoints on the
original route. As a consequence, the FMS continued
to consider them as “active” (i.e., as valid targets)
since the airplane never came close enough for them
to be removed by the automation’s logic. As a result,
pilots who re-activated LNAV to resume the course
without first modifying the route in the CDU caused
the airplane to turn off-course to a 090 heading
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Figure 1. Composite of abstracted solution paths for
LNAV event. Each line represents one pilot and is
color-coded for all pilots.
For the second group of pilots, it was not immediately
obvious that there was a problem because the incorrect
FMS route produced aircraft behavior that was initially
consistent with pilot expectations. Since the FMS
believed that the floating waypoint (a turn to a 090
degree heading) was the current target, activation of
the LNAV mode resulted in a turn in the expected
direction (left) but not to the assigned heading of 070
degrees. This confirming cue initially masked the
problem and led some pilots to assume the aircraft was
on the correct course.
Six of the seven pilots in the second group (top
portion of Figure 1) recovered the correct heading by
reverting back to the HDG SEL mode, after detecting
either the unexpectedly rapid engagement (or
“capture”) of the LNAV mode or the subsequently
incorrect heading of 090 degrees that was
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commanded by the autopilot. Of the six pilots that
recovered with HDG SEL, one of them detected the
active waypoint mismatch at this point and
reprogrammed the route, while five of them
reattempted to engage the LNAV mode, again,
without reprogramming the route. This repeat
strategy worked for three pilots but it worked by
chance, since enough time and distance had elapsed
for the FMS to automatically advance to the next
waypoint and thus for the route to be corrected.

composite

VNAV ALT

changes CDU
climb altitude

repeats
change CDU
climb altitude

selects DES NOW

Pushes FLCH

Descends early

pushes alt knob

changes CDU
cruise altitude

pushes alt knob

descends
on-time

Canonical path

pushes
VNAV

Descends late

None of the seven pilots who prematurely engaged
the LNAV mode was able to explain the cause of the
unexpected behavior prior to beginning recovery
actions. The debriefing confirmed that the seven
pilots who did not understand the observed LNAV
behavior were either unaware of which waypoint was
active during the event and/or were generally
unfamiliar with floating waypoints and their effect on
arming the LNAV mode after a deviation. One pilot
believed that the unexpected LNAV behavior was a
“malfunction.”
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Figure 2. Composite of abstracted solution paths for
VNAV ALT event. Each line represents one pilot and
is color-coded for all pilots.

The event was “successful” in the sense that the
VNAV ALT mode became active during cruise in ten
of the twelve cases. In the other two cases, the pilots
(4 and 10) proactively reprogrammed the FMS prior
to reaching the new cruise altitude and went directly
to the VNAV PTH mode. Three of the ten ‘VNAV
ALT’ pilots (1, 2, and 3) successfully returned to the
VNAV PTH mode by completing the canonical path.

The other seven pilots remained in the incorrect mode
(VNAV ALT) for a majority of the cruise phase. Note
that there were no observable consequences of being in
the VNAV ALT mode during this phase, since the
aircraft was flying at a level altitude. Unwanted
consequences would only appear when the aircraft
reached the TOD point, approximately 20 minutes later,
and would fail to begin the descent, creating the
potential for the aircraft to miss programmed altitude
restrictions. In the debriefing, all of these pilots were
found to have gaps in their knowledge related to the
functioning of the VNAV PTH and VNAV ALT
modes. Interestingly, four of these seven pilots (5, 6, 8,
and 12) avoided the consequence of the incorrect
automation setting – the failure to descend automatically
at the TOD – by deciding to descend earlier than the
TOD point. In other words, the gaps in their mental
model of the VNAV mode were either masked or
worked-around by their early descent strategy, which
they stated was based on the desire to alleviate workload
during the descent. In contrast, three pilots (7, 9, and 11)
remained in VNAV ALT at the TOD, and the aircraft
did not descend as they had intended.

The solution path for Pilot 3 is an example of a pilot
who recovered the VNAV PTH mode from the
VNAV ALT mode, though using an extraneous
sequence of actions in addition to the canonical path .
This strategy was described later by the pilot as
“pushing buttons until it worked” and “resetting” the
system, but also reflected incomplete knowledge of
how to deal with this problem efficiently. Although
the pilot did not understand why he was in the wrong
mode, he knew that it was incorrect, and worked to
resolve that discrepancy.

Of the three pilots (7, 9, and 11) who did not initiate
an early descent, two recognized quickly that the
aircraft had not started to descend and recovered by
engaging the FLCH mode. One pilot (Pilot 11) was
distracted with arrival preparations for almost 10
minutes after passing the TOD point, and recovered
late by engaging the FLCH mode. During the event,
none of these three pilots were able to explain why
the aircraft did not descend as expected, suggesting
an incomplete understanding of the automation that
was later confirmed during the debriefing.

VNAV ALT Mode
The canonical path for handling this event involves
two steps: 1) entering the new cruise altitude into the
FMS, and 2) pushing the altitude knob to make the
FMS accept the new value (Figure 2). Completing
these actions results in the activation of the VNAV
PTH mode, which is necessary to achieve the desired
descent profile. Otherwise, the automation remains in
the VNAV ALT mode.
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Discussion
All pilots completed the scenario “successfully” in
the sense that they managed to complete the flight
and land safely. At the same time, all participants
experienced at least one disturbance during the
course of the scenario. Note that these disturbances
did not result from system faults. Rather, potentially
unproblematic events were “managed” into
disturbances from which pilots then had to recover.
One important goal of the current study was to explore
the need for, and the effectiveness of, diagnosing
errors and disturbances in the context of dynamic
event-driven systems. In the present study, pilots rarely
attempted to diagnose the source of a disturbance,
except in two unsuccessful cases (two different pilots
during two different events) in which pilots remained
fixated on an incorrect diagnosis. This finding is in
agreement with earlier findings from other dynamic
domains where the absence of diagnostic activities was
explained by time pressure and the need for immediate
recovery to avoid negative consequences (Kanse and
Schaaf, 2001; Kontogiannis, 1999; Reason, 1990).
While time pressure and the immediate need to recover
from disturbances (i.e., in cases of impending or actual
deviations from assigned routes or altitudes) may have
precluded diagnosis in many cases, it was also absent
from contexts that were not time critical (i.e., the
majority of the cruise phase in the VNAV ALT event).
This may, in part, be explained by considerable
knowledge gaps in pilot mental models of the
automation which were observed in earlier research
(Sarter and Woods, 2000; Mumaw et al., 2000) and
confirmed in this study. For example, nine of 12 pilots
in this study were found to have incomplete or
inaccurate knowledge of the vertical navigation
(VNAV) submodes of the FMS. These misconceptions
– which were sometimes masked by serendipitous
pilot actions that produced apparently seamless
performance - likely contributed to problems with
detecting, diagnosing and recovering from
disturbances, and in some cases, even exacerbated the
existing disturbance.
While the absence of diagnostic activities did not
result in catastrophic outcomes, it may have affected
the success and efficiency of recovery. In most cases,
pilots used generic recovery strategies (repeating
actions or resetting the automation) or engaged in
trial-and-error behavior, rather than developing and
implementing a problem-specific solution. In most
cases, these generic recovery strategies, and also the
observed tendency to use high levels of automation to
manage disturbances (contrary to what is typically
prescribed by training), were not successful and

instead led to a delay in recovery, which further
exacerbated the disturbance.
After detecting the disturbance in the LNAV Capture
Event, pilots commonly resorted first to a “quick fix”
by reverting to a lower-level mode (HDG SEL) in
order to immediately correct the heading. This choice
was likely prompted by the urgency of this
disturbance which, over time, was producing an
escalating divergence between the required and
actual course. The use of such quick-fixes has been
observed by other authors (Kontogiannis, 1999;
Kanse and Schaaf, 2001) in process control domains.
In those cases, they served to stabilize a situation in
order to allow for an analysis of the problem and/or
more thorough corrective actions. In contrast, five
pilots in our scenario followed the “quick fix” with
just a generic repetition of the LNAV engagement,
without any further analysis or modification of the
automation’s instructions.
The repetition strategy - observed primarily in the
LNAV event - seemed to be based on pilots’
erroneous belief that the original action was
appropriate but that the automation, for some reason,
did not accept the pilot’s input or execute the
command as intended. This example illustrates that
coincidentally successful strategies can lead to
erroneous beliefs which can become incorporated
into a pilot’s mental model of the system. As a result,
pilots may develop misrepresentations of functional
system architecture that can lead to miscalibration of
their system knowledge.
The resetting strategy - observed for 2 pilots during the
VNAV ALT event - appears to be a type of workaround
that did not require deeper system knowledge of how
the disturbance occurred or how to avoid it in the future.
Interestingly, both repetition and resetting strategies
were observed by Plat and Amalberti (2000) in a
simulator study of pilot responses to experimenterinduced software “bugs” or malfunctions in the behavior
of the flight deck automation. This suggests that some
pilots in our scenario treated disturbances as if they were
discrete malfunctions which were unavoidable (i.e., not
attributable to their actions) and required only
generic fixes that did not require accurate or detailed
system knowledge. However, these strategies can
be brittle in that they may work in some contexts, but
may not be effective in others, especially in
unforgiving environments.
In addition, our findings indicate that disturbance
management was not always well-supported by the
available feedback to pilots. In the case of the VNAV
ALT event, pilots were unable to visualize the
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implications of the active mode for the descent since
there is no predictive vertical profile display. Instead,
pilots are shown only a symbol and adjacent
alphanumeric label (“T/D”) representing the top-ofdescent point on the map display. Aside from an
alphanumeric mode annunciation on the PFD (i.e.,
“VNAV ALT”) they receive no salient indication on
the map display of whether the top-of-descent will be
honored by the system. As a result, the current
feedback may contribute to delays in detecting the
error, which in turn, allow the disturbance in the
aircraft’s profile to escalate.
Conclusion
Error prevention alone will never be sufficient for
improving safety in complex high-risk systems.
Rather, a deeper understanding is needed of how
human operators cope with the consequence of
inevitable errors and thus the disturbances to the
processes they monitor and control. The problems of
inadequate feedback of autonomous system changes
have been widely discussed (Sarter and Woods, 1995;
Wiener, 1989) and have also been observed in the
current study. However, these problems have often
been discussed in the context of detecting the existence
of an erroneous setting (e.g., “mode awareness” and
“automation surprises”). Observations of pilot
performance in the present study have shown that
current automation design not only delays detection,
but is too ambiguous for diagnosis, and does not
support operators in recovering from disturbances in
the most optimal way. Continued efforts in this area
will inform the design of cognitive tools that
effectively support this process.
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